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JOHN J. DUFFEY*
The existence of a building or structure upon property to be con-
demned for highway purposes has had important effect upon appropriation
procedures and upon the rights of -both condemnor and landowner. The
recent amendments to Ohio Rev. Code Sections 5519.01 and 5519.03
more nearly equate appropriation of vacant property and the appropriation
of property containing a building or structure.
In the appropriation of vacant property, the director of highways
makes a finding as to the necessity for the taking. Included in such
finding is a determination of the value of the property, together with the
amount of damages to residue. Upon depositing that sum in court for the
use and benefit of the owner, the statute provides that "thereupon the
director may take possession of and enter upon said property .... )3
The effect of this statute is to grant the director an option to enter
and. take possession. If he does not enter or change the property appro-
priated, he may abandon the appropriation at any time not later than
thirty days after the final determination of the cause.' If the director
chooses to take possession or change the property, an appeal by the land-
owner does not affect the director's right to retain possession. However,
the director loses the right to abandon the proceedings.$
Both Ohio Rev. Code Sections 5519.01 and 5519.02, prior to the
recent amendment, applied to 'cproperty" to be appropriated. Although
neither referred expressly to buildings or structures, they appeared to
establish the procedure for the appropriation of both vacant and occupied
property. However, Ohio Rev. Code Section 5519.03, requires the jury
in assessing compensation to make separate findings for the value of the
land and the value of the structure. Prior to its recent amendment, the
statute also provided:
Title to said structure shall vest in the state with the right to
enter upon the site of said structure and adjoining land upon
which it is located for the purpose of removing the structure
therefrom.
In 1951, a Court of Appeals case interpreted Section 5519.03 as
modifying the power of entry granted the director under Sections
5519.01 and 5519.02.' Under the view in that case, the vesting of title
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1 Ohio Rev. Code §5519.01. The statute further provides for notice to the
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to a structure is stayed, and entry upon the property prohibited until after
the assessment of compensation by the jury.
This distinction in the right of entry between vacant property and
property occupied by a structure had ramifications upon the date of
valuation. The general rule is, of course, that value is determined as of
the time of the taking. In the case of vacant property, when entry is made
after deposit, the time of taking, at the latest, would appear to be the
time of entry. If the right of entry was not exercised, the time of taking
would appear to be that of trial.5 Having held that the vesting of title
and right of entry were stayed until assessment by the jury in the case
of property occupied by a structure, the court followed through by hold-
ing that the time of taking and therefore the date of valuation, was the
time of trial.6
This interpretation of Section 5519.03 obviously could substantially
delay a highway project. On the other hand, the entry and destruction
of a structure prior to trial could be seriously prejudicial to the land-
owner's case. It would dearly deprive the jury df any opportunity to
view the structure at all, or at least in its original state depending upon
the extent of the taking.
In amending Sections 5519.01 and 5519.03, the legislature has
apparently compromised between the interest of the state and the need
to protect the landowner. Section 5519.01 has been amended to specifi-
cally permit the director upon deposit of the money in court to "take
possession of and enter upon said property, including the buildings and
structures thereon. . . ." (Emphasis supplied). This would appear to
grant the director power to take possession immediately upon depositing
the money in court. However, Section 5519.03 was amended by adding
the following sentence:
The owner or occupant of such structure shall vacate the
same within sixty days after service of notice as required under
the provisions of section 5519.01 of the Revised Code, after
which time the director may remove said structures.
Construing these two statutes together and trying to give full effect
to both suggests the conclusion that the director may enter upon and take
possession of the land, but cannot, without the owner's or occupant's con-
sent, take possession of any structure prior to the expiration of sixty days
from the service of notice. But, it is arguable that no right of entry even
as to the land accrues until after the expiration of the time period.
Either interpretation resurrects the question of the proper date for
valuation. As noted In Re Appropriation of Easement ties the time of
valuation to the time possession is taken, or the time of trial, whichever
is earlier. Following that view it would appear that where the director
5 The highway department has argued that the taking occurs at the time
the director files his resolution. See In Re Appropriation of Easement, supra,
note 4.
6 Id. at 479, 107 N.E 2d 391.
1956]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
exercises his power of entry, the latest date for valuation would be that
of taking possession of the structure. But if the director may enter upon
the land immediately after deposit in court, a strong argument can be
made for valuation at that date. Certainly it would be undesirable to
have one date of valuation for the land and another for the structure.
On that basis, it would seem most likely that a court would take the date
of the taking of the structure. That in turn suggests that the proper
interpretation of the statutes is that entry without consent cannot be made
as to either the land or the structure until after sixty days from the
service of notice.
The legislature, in an apparent attempt to reconcile its desire to
expedite construction with its desire to protect the landowner, also added
the folloWing provision to Section 5519.03:
In the event such structures are removed before the jury has
fixed the value of the same, the director, before such removal,
shall cause an appraisal to be made by three persons, one to be
appointed .by the owner, one by the county auditor, and one by
the director, and such appraisal may be used as evidence by the
owner or director in the trial of said case but shall not be
binding on said owner, director or the jury, and the expense of
said appraisal shall be approved by the court and charged as
costs in said case; shall cause pictures to be taken of all sides of
said structure; and shall compile a complete description of said
structure, which he shall preserve as evidence in said case to
which the owner or occupants shall have access.
The provision for appraisers smacks somewhat of arbitration. It
apparently contemplates that the three appraisers will arrive at a single
appraisal. While one can at most only guess on how a jury will react to
particular evidence, such an appraisal ought to be fairly persuasive. The
wisdom of this appraisal provision cannot be judged until there has been
some trial experience. The choice of the county auditor as the "neutral"
seems somewhat strange. The usual practice has been to use a judge.
The equirement of pictures, and of a complete description, seems
good common sense.
One further innovation in the statute should be noted. Where the
owner appeals the director's valuation and receives a jury trial, Section
5519.02 provides as follows:
If the court finds that such appeal has been properly perfected,
and that proceedings are substantially regular, the court shall
transmit to the director the money deposited in the court for the
use and benefit of the appellant.
However Section 5519.03 as amended provides:
Furthermore, where a building or structure is taken and the
owner has appealed from the amount of compensation and
damages as fixed by the director, at anytime before the termina-
tion of said case, said owner may apply to the court in which
said case is pending to withdraw the portion of the deposit
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representing the sum fixed for said structure and such with-
drawal shall in no way interfere with said case except the sum
so withdrawn shall 'be deducted from the sum of the final
verdict. Upon such application being made the court shall direct
the clerk of courts to pay said sum to such owner or owners.
Giving effect to the apparent purpose of the amendment, it would appear
that under Section 5519.01, the court should transmit to the director
only that portion of the deposit which is in excess of the compensation
allocated by the director to the structure. Obviously the director must
separately state the value of the structure in his resolution.
Some difficulty may be encountered in implementing this provision
for drawing upon the deposit. For example, problems will be found in
cases where the title to the structure is disputed or even if the title is
merely doubtful.
It is to be hoped that no jury will complicate matters by returning
a total compensation below the amount established by the director for the
structure!
